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NOTES
OREGON V. ELSTAD: BOLDLY STEPPING
BACKWARDS TO PRE-MIRANDA DAYS?
The self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment protects criminal de-
fendants against the adverse use of their own incriminating statements ob-
tained through governmental coercion.' The privilege against self-
incrimination2 embodies a constitutional exclusionary rule3 guaranteeing the
exclusion from evidence of all coerced testimony.4 The Supreme Court and
commentators have, at various times, identified four general purposes of the
privilege: (1) safeguarding the accusatory nature of the criminal justice
system;5 (2) protecting the individual from the power of the govern-
1. The fifth amendment provides: "No person ...shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a detailed account of
the history of the fifth amendment, see L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968).
2. The privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to federal and state governmental
action. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (incorporating fifth amendment's self-incrimina-
tion clause into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment). The privilege is a per-
sonal right, "applying only to natural individuals." United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698
(1944). As such, it does not apply to corporations, Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382
(1911), associations, Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1951), or non-personal
partnerships, Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 101 (1974). For an in-depth review of the
origins and nature of the self-incrimination privilege, see generally M. BERGER, TAKING THE
FIFTH: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 1-41
(1980). See also Sunderland, Self-Incrimination and Constitutional Principle: Miranda v. Ari-
zona and Beyond, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 171, 173-88 (1979) (identification of the various
English and American rationales for the privilege against self-incrimination).
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (the fifth amendment requires exclusion
of coerced testimonial evidence absent constitutionally mandated safeguards). Cf Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976) (the fifth amendment is by definition an exclusionary
rule).
4. Non-testimonial evidence is not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination
even though it may be incriminating. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7
(1973) (voice recordings); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265-66 (1967) (handwriting sam-
ples); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221 (1967) (voice and body in police lineups);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966) (blood samples).
5. See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976) ("[tlhe fundamental purpose of
the Fifth Amendment [is] the preservation of an adversary system of criminal justice"); Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 231 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the objective of the privilege
against self-incrimination is one of "safeguarding the integrity of our adversary system"); Mur-
phy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (the privilege against self-incrimination
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ment;6 (3) ensuring the credibility of evidence;7 and (4) preserving the indi-
vidual's right to privacy.'
Although the self-incrimination clause requires exclusion of all testimony
obtained directly through governmental coercion, the precise scope of the
fifth amendment exclusionary rule is not entirely clear. In 1966, the
Supreme Court, in Miranda v. Arizona,9 recognized that, under the fifth
amendment, statements obtained from a suspect during custodial interroga-
tion without the administration of prescribed warnings must be excluded
from the prosecution's case-in-chief as the product of presumed coercion.' °
The Miranda decision made clear that the fifth amendment exclusionary rule
applies to any statements obtained directly from a custodial interrogation
conducted without the requisite warnings. Whether derivative evidence or
"fruit"" of the initial Miranda violation must likewise be excluded, how-
ever, remained an open question. Although the Court has had the opportu-
nity to decide the question on more than one occasion since Miranda,'2 it
has sidestepped an unequivocal resolution of the issue.
It was not until 1985, in Oregon v. Elstad,'3 that the Supreme Court un-
reflects "our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal jus-
tice"). See also Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 99, 156.
6. See Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8-9 (the purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination is
to protect individuals against the all-powerful state). See also Friendly, The Fifth Amendment
Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 723 (1968) ("protec-
tion of the lone individual against the all-powerful state" is the fundamental purpose of the
self-incrimination clause); E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 30 (1955) (the
privilege exists to protect "the individual against the collective power of the state").
7. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967) ("The privilege against self-incrimination is, of
course, related to the question of the safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or confes-
sions are reasonably trustworthy, that they are not the mere fruits of fear or coercion, but are
reliable expressions of the truth."); Sunderland, supra note 2, at 187 ("[v]arious forms of coer-
cion may force an individual to admit practically anything," resulting in evidence that is "tes-
timonially untrustworthy.").
8. See Tehan v. United States ex. rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (the self-incrimina-
tion privilege "stands as a protection of... the right of each individual to be let alone"). See
also Berger, The Underprivileged Status of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 15 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 191, 213 (1978) (privilege is to protect individual dignity and privacy). But see Fisher,
425 U.S. at 400 (rejecting the protection of an individual's privacy as a value underlying the
self-incrimination privilege). See also Friendly, supra note 6, at 687-88 (privacy protection is
not a fundamental purpose of the fifth amendment). For a summary and explanation of the
various underlying values of the fifth amendment, see Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith
Exception to the Miranda Rule-A Critique, 35 HASTINGS L. J. 429, 442-45 (1984).
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (discussed infra at notes 48-72 and accompanying text).
10. Id. at 444, 479.
11. "Fruit" refers to the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. See infra note 15.
12. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (discussed infra notes 93-115 and
accompanying text); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (issue argued by parties, but not
discussed by Court).
13. 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).
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dertook to address the question directly. 4 Relying largely on the reasoning
and dicta of case law subsequent to Miranda, the Court concluded that the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine does not apply to uncoerced consecu-
tive confessions separated only by the administration of the Miranda
warnings."5
James Elstad, an eighteen-year-old burglary suspect, made an incriminat-
ing statement to police officers in a custodial setting without having received
the requisite Miranda warnings." After the officers transported Elstad to
the police station and administered him the Miranda warnings, they re-
sumed questioning him. At that point, Elstad executed a waiver of his rights
and signed a written confession implicating himself in the burglary. 7 Elstad
also waived his right to a jury trial, and a county circuit court judge con-
victed him of first-degree burglary, having overruled his motion to suppress
the written confession as tainted by the initial Miranda violation.' 8 The
Court of Appeals of Oregon reversed the conviction, concluding that be-
tween Elstad's initial inadmissible statement and his subsequent written con-
fession, there had not been an adequate break in the stream of events to
dissipate the coercive effect of having let the "cat out of the bag" in the first
confession. '9 Thus, the appellate court held that Elstad's written confession,
in addition to his unwarned admission, should have been excluded from evi-
dence, and remanded the case for a new trial.2 ° The Oregon Supreme Court
14. Id. at 1288.
15. See id. at 1298. The phrase "fruit of the poisonous tree" was coined by Justice Frank-
furter in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). The underlying doctrine is a
judicially created concept generally associated with, although not limited to, the fourth amend-
ment protection against unreasonable search and seizure. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 482 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976); United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). The doctrine was first articulated in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), in which the Court stated, "[t]he essence of a provision
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired
shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all." Id. at 392. The doctrine
thus excludes evidence derived from inadmissible sources as tainted by the primary illegality.
In 1963, this concept was expanded to include confessions made by a defendant whose fourth
amendment rights had been violated. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
The Supreme Court has identified a deterrence rationale for the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule and the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. See, e.g., Stone, 428 U.S. at 486; Janis,
428 U.S. at 446-54; Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
16. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1289. Although the police questioned Elstad in his home, the
state conceded that he was in custody for purposes of Miranda at the time he made his incrimi-
nating statement. Id. at 1290.
17. Id. at 1289.
18. See id. at 1289-90.
19. Oregon v. Elstad, 61 Or. App. 673, 673, 658 P.2d 552, 553-55 (1983) (citing United
States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947)). See infra note 171.
20. Elstad, 61 Or. App. at 678, 658 P.2d at 553-55.
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denied the state's petition for review of the appellate court's decision. 2'
The United States Supreme Court, in a six to three decision, reversed and
held that there is no justification for presuming coercive impact on a second
confession following an initial Miranda violation where the defendant has
made both statements voluntarily.22 In a strong dissenting opinion, Justice
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, asserted that the majority underesti-
mated the coercive effect of an initial admission made without the benefit of
Miranda warnings and was thus at odds with the Miranda decision itself.
23
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissenting opinion, contended that there is in-
herent coercion in a confession absent Miranda warnings that increases the
coercion presumed to exist in a subsequent custodial interrogation, thereby
placing a heavier burden on the prosecution to overcome that
24presumption.
This Note will provide an overview of judicial interpretation and applica-
tion of the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment. Particular em-
phasis will be placed on the values underlying the fifth amendment privilege
and the degree to which they serve to shape case results. Additionally, the
Court's gradual redefinition of those values, and the extent to which such
redefinition has affected its interpretation of the self-incrimination clause,
will be a primary area of focus. An analysis of Elstad will suggest a return
by the Supreme Court to a pre-Miranda, case-by-case approach to the privi-
lege against self-incrimination through a piecemeal, but determined, narrow-
ing of the scope of the Miranda doctrine. The Note will conclude that the
Elstad decision leaves Miranda and the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doc-
trine effective only in situations involving actual coercion, as defined by the
due process standard. The likely result will be inconsistent application of
this standard by lower courts.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW INTERPRETING AND APPLYING THE
SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. Pre-Miranda: Coerced Confession Doctrine
As early as the 1930's, coercive interrogation tactics used by police to
extract confessions from criminal suspects posed a problem for state courts
when considering the introduction of such compelled testimonial evidence.25
21. See Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1290.
22. Id. at 1298. See infra notes 152-83 and accompanying text.
23. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1302-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra notes 184-205 and
accompanying text.
24. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1324-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See infra notes 206-12 and
accompanying text.
25. See Gardner, supra note 8, at 445; Stone, supra note 5, at 101.
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From 1936, when the Supreme Court first addressed this problem,26 until it
decided Miranda v. Arizona27 in 1966, the test was one of fundamental fair-
ness based on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.2"
In Brown v. Mississippi,29 the Court's first state case involving a compelled
confession, the Court developed a "coerced confession" doctrine to exclude
incriminating statements obtained through police tactics that were "revolt-
ing to the sense of justice.",30 Brown concerned homicide convictions based
upon confessions elicited by hanging and whipping the defendants. 3' Under
the coerced confession doctrine, a court was required to examine, on a case-
by-case basis, the "totality of the circumstances" in order to determine
whether the tactics used overbore the suspect's free will and, therefore,
amounted to coercion violative of due process. 32 Because coerced confes-
sions were generally of doubtful reliability, the Court's goal in mandating
their exclusion was one of obtaining trustworthy testimony. 33 As this due
process standard was applied in subsequent cases, its rationale, initially to
exclude unreliable evidence,34 was slowly expanded to include preservation
of an accusatorial criminal justice system and maintenance of fair police
26. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
27. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
28. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S.
560 (1958); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Cham-
bers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940). It was not until 1964 that the fifth amendment was held
applicable to the states. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). Thus, from 1936 until
1964, the states could only protect defendants against coerced confessions through application
of the fourteenth amendment which provides that a state shall not deprive a person of, inter
alia, liberty without "due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
29. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
30. Id. at 286 ("[i]t would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense
of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the
confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due
process"). Subsequently, the Court first enunciated an objective test and then later a subjective
test for determining whether admissions should be excluded from evidence as involuntary.
Compare Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945) (objective standards should be ap-
plied to determine whether tactics used are violative of due process), and Ashcraft v. Tennes-
see, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944) (certain tactics used to elicit confessions are inherently coercive
without regard to an individual's subjective characteristics), with Culombe v. Connecticut, 367
U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (subjective test of voluntariness), and Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191,
197-98 (1957) (individual's subjective characteristics of weak will and mind taken into consid-
eration in determining voluntariness of confession).
31. Brown, 297 U.S. at 281-83.
32. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963). This "totality of the circumstances"
requirement included an examination of the characteristics of the confessor as well as the
behavior of the police. See, e.g., Culombe, 367 U.S. at 601-02; Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 442-
43 (1961); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185-86 (1953).
33. See 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2, at 442 (1984).
34. See, e.g., Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547
(1942); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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practices.35
Gradually, the Court became aware that the coerced confession doctrine
was ineffective in eliminating coercive interrogation tactics. 36 Because appli-
cation of the doctrine required an evaluation of all relevant aspects of each
challenged confession, and because the Supreme Court was unable to articu-
late precise decisional standards, cases among the state courts achieved in-
consistent results.37 Moreover, application of the due process standard by
35. As LaFave and Israel noted, "[w]hile it is fair to say that ensuring the reliability of
confessions is a goal under the due process voluntariness standard, it is incorrect to define the
standard in terms of that one objective." 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 33, at 442
(emphasis in original). See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961). The Court
noted:
Our decisions under. . . [the Fourteenth] Amendment have made clear that convic-
tions following the admission into evidence of confessions which are involuntary, i e.,
the product of coercion, either physical or psychological, cannot stand. This is so not
because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to
extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law:
that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system-a system in which the
State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not
by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth.
Id. In another case the Court stated, "[u]se of involuntary verbal confessions in State criminal
trials is constitutionally obnoxious not only because of their unreliability. They are inadmissi-
ble under the Due Process Clause even though statements contained in them may be indepen-
dently established as true. Coerced confessions offend the community's sense of fair play and
decency." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952). For a discussion of the rationales
underlying the coerced confession doctrine, see generally Comment, The Coerced Confession
Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 313 (1964).
36. As Justice Clark wrote:
[Tihe practical result of this ad hoc approach is simply that when five Justices are
sufficiently revolted by local police action a conviction is overturned and a guilty man
may go free. . . . We may thus vindicate the abstract principle of due process, but
we do not shape the conduct of local police one whit; unpredictable reversals on
dissimilar fact situations are not likely to curb the zeal of those police and prosecu-
tors who may be intent on racking up a high percentage of successful prosecutions.
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138 (1954) (Clark, J., concurring). See Kamisar, A Dissent
from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old
"Voluntariness" Test, 65 MIcH. L. REV. 59, 94-104 (1966) (general discussion of the weakness
of the coerced confession doctrine).
37. See Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859,
863 (1979). "The Court's general unwillingness to articulate the policies underlying volitional
terminology explains the ambiguity of [the] voluntariness doctrine. . . . [T]he Court's failure
in this regard accounts for the intolerable uncertainty that characterized the thirty-year reign
of the due process voluntariness doctrine in the law of confessions." Id. "Judicial decisions
speak in terms of the 'voluntariness' of a confession, but the term itself provides little guidance.
To the extent 'voluntariness' has made a determination of the state of an individual's will the
crucial question, it has not assisted analysis." Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interroga-
tion and the Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 62, 72 (1966); see also Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 869
(1981) ("standard left police without needed guidance").
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state courts hampered effective judicial review. By leaving state courts with
an imprecise standard, the Supreme Court invited judges to employ their
subjective preferences in the voluntariness evaluation.38 The end result was
judicial validation and affirmance by state courts of confessions of questiona-
ble constitutionality.39
The Supreme Court responded to the shortcomings of the coerced confes-
sion doctrine in 1964 with two decisions based on the sixth amendment
guarantee of the right to counsel in criminal proceedings. Initially, in Mas-
siah v. United States, 40 the Court held that the right to counsel attaches at
the post-indictment stage of a criminal proceeding, and that any incriminat-
ing statements made in the absence of counsel during that "critical" period
must be excluded.41 However, because Massiah concerned only post-indict-
ment confessions, it did not address the preindictment stage, during which
the overwhelming majority of police interrogations take place.42 Accord-
ingly, only five weeks after Massiah, the Court, in Escobedo v. Illinois,43
while still focusing on the sixth amendment, extended its holding in Massiah
to include interrogations conducted in the preindictment phase of the pro-
ceeding.' Although the Court explicitly limited its holding to the specific
facts of the case, 45 it intimated that the right to remain silent arose from the
privilege against self-incrimination secured by the fifth amendment. 46 In so
38. See Schulhofer, supra note 37, at 869-70.
39. See Stone, supra note 5, at 102. See also Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court:
Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 414 (1982).
40. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
41. Id. at 206. Prior to Massiah, access to counsel was considered under the coerced
confession doctrine as one of the relevant criteria to be evaluated within the "totality of the
circumstances." See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357
U.S. 504 (1958).
42. See Stone, supra note 5, at 103.
43. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
44. Id. at 490-91. Justice Goldberg, writing for the majority, noted that "no meaningful
distinction can be drawn between interrogation of an accused before and after formal indict-
ment." Id. at 486.
45. See id. at 490-91. The Escobedo majority limited its holding to the following situation:
[W]here, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into
police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an op-
portunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him
of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent . . . no statement elicited by the
police during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial.
Id.
46. Justice Goldberg stated that "a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to
depend on the 'confession' will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than
a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investiga-
tion." Id. at 488-89 (footnotes omitted).
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doing, the Court laid the groundwork for its subsequent ruling based upon
the fifth amendment.4 7
B. Miranda v. Arizona: Demise of the Coerced Confession Doctrine
Two years later in Miranda v. Arizona,48 the Court shifted its focus on the
admissibility of incriminating statements from the sixth amendment to the
fifth. The Court stated that it granted certiorari in Miranda in order to af-
ford persons subjected to custodial interrogation protection against self-in-
crimination, and to announce "concrete constitutional guidelines for law
enforcement agencies and courts to follow. ' 49 The Court proceeded to es-
tablish an absolute exclusionary rule based on the fifth amendment to be
objectively applied to all statements obtained during custodial interrogation
prior to the administration of prescribed warnings.5" As a prerequisite to
the admission of a suspect's in-custody statements, the Court held that the
government must establish that the warnings have been administered and
that a knowing and voluntary waiver has been properly executed by the
suspect.51
Crucial to the Court's holding was its characterization of custodial police
interrogations as inherently coercive.52 In reaching its conclusion, the Court
reviewed various police interrogation manuals and other materials describ-
ing a multitude of psychological tactics used by interrogators to elicit confes-
47. Escobedo is looked upon by commentators as the precursor to Miranda. See, e.g.,
Gardner, supra note 8, at 447 n.125.
48. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
49. Id. at 441-42.
50. Id. at 444. Articulating its strict exclusionary rule, the Court stated:
[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stem-
ming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination ...
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
Id.
51. See id. at 444, 476, 479.
52. The Court asserted that "[u]nless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel
the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant
can truly be the product of his free choice." Id. at 458. More to the point, the Court further
noted that "fa]n individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded
by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion. . . cannot be otherwise
than under compulsion to speak." Id. at 461. See Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of
Benefit and the Modern Law of Confessions, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 275, 295 (stating that the
Court's concern in Miranda "was no longer focused upon blatant police misconduct, such as
physical violence . . . [but instead was upon] more subtle influences, such as what [was] per-
ceived as the inherently coercive nature of any custodial interrogation").
[Vol. 35:245
Oregon v. Elstad
sions from criminal suspects during custodial interrogation.5 3 The Court
recognized that psychological coercion was present in a custodial setting
even in the absence of actual physical coercion.54 The now-familiar Miranda
warnings were the result of the Court's effort to dispel the inherently coer-
cive atmosphere of custodial interrogation and thereby protect fifth amend-
ment rights. 5
Eschewing the case-by-case approach of the coerced confession doctrine,56
the Court sought to establish an absolute standard of admissibility to be ap-
plied to all statements obtained through custodial interrogation.57 Accord-
ingly, the Court rejected a "balancing" test between "society's need for
interrogation" and the individual's guaranteed privilege against self-incrimi-
nation-the approach previously employed by the Court under the due pro-
cess standard.58 It asserted instead that the suspect's privilege "cannot be
abridged."5' 9 In addition, the Court dismissed, as mere speculation, evalua-
tions based upon the subjective characteristics of a defendant, deeming such
attributes as age, intelligence, and level of education irrelevant.6" Holding
that all statements obtained in violation of its strictures were irrebuttably
presumed to be the product of coercion and hence inadmissible, the Court
set forth a "bright line" test to be applied in every such instance.6 '
By its strict exclusionary rule, the Miranda Court sought to promote what
it perceived as the primary values underlying the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Convinced that unduly coercive methods of cus-
todial interrogation were prevalent, the Court advanced its exclusionary rule
to protect the accusatory nature of the criminal justice system. 62 Further-
53. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-56.
54. See id. at 455. The Court found that the custodial "atmosphere carries its own badge
of intimidation," id. at 457, and that "[e]ven without employing brutality,. . . the very fact of
custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of
individuals." Id. at 455 (footnote omitted). In reference to the specific facts of the cases before
it, the Court noted, "we might not find the defendants' statements to have been involuntary in
traditional terms." Id. at 457.
55. See id. at 465. See also supra text accompanying note 49.
56. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
57. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468. In this regard, the Court stated, "[t]he Fifth Amend-
ment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient of
giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to
inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning
being given." Id. (emphasis added).
58. See id. at 479.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 468-69. "Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on in-
formation as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can never be
more than speculation." Id.
61. See id. at 444, 457-58, 461, 470. See also supra note 50 and accompanying text.
62. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460. "[O]ur accusatory system of criminal justice demands
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more, in an effort to dissipate the coercive atmosphere of custodial interroga-
tions, the Court prescribed the Miranda warnings to safeguard the suspect's
dignity and free will, thereby enabling him to make an informed decision
whether to remain silent.
63
The goals of deterring improper police conduct and obtaining reliable tes-
timonial evidence, previously motivating the Court under the coerced con-
fession doctrine,' 4 were not seen by the Miranda Court as primary purposes
for protecting the privilege against self-incrimination.65 Although Miranda
recognized the need to deter illegal police behavior, it viewed that function
simply as a means of promoting the primary interests of the fifth amend-
that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its
own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his
own mouth." Id. (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235-38 (1940)). See also Gard-
ner, supra note 8, at 453 ("requiring the police to inform suspects of their right to remain
silent, the Miranda Court sought to guarantee that the accusatorial safeguards were not ren-
dered meaningless by police interrogation practices").
63. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460. "[T]he privilege is fulfilled only when the person is
guaranteed the right 'to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of
his own will.'" Id. (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)). See also Schrock, Welsh
& Collins, Interrogational Rights: Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,
33-56 (1978); Dix, supra note 52, at 295-96. But see Goldberg, Escobedo and Miranda Revis-
ited, 18 AKRON L. REV. 177, 181 (1984), where Justice Arthur Goldberg states that the effi-
cacy of the Miranda warnings is a function of the profile of the suspect:
Miranda warnings, as experience teaches, have limited utility. Lay persons, in police
custody, simply cannot anticipate how what they agree to say will be used against
them later. Such suspects, more often than not, do not comprehend the significance
of a Miranda warning, because they lack the legal training or often even literacy
needed to understand the different ways statements can incriminate them.
Id. Further, Justice Goldberg is of the opinion that Miranda does not really offer substantial
protection to suspects because "we have no way of knowing what else the police may have
added after a Miranda warning." Id.
64. See supra notes 33, 36 and accompanying text.
65. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460. As Justice Harlan noted in his dissent, "[tihe [Miranda
warnings] are not designed to guard against police brutality or other unmistakably banned
forms of coercion. Those who use third-degree tactics and deny them in court are equally able
and destined to lie as skillfully about warnings and waivers." Id. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing). See also Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326 (1969) (implying that deterrence of police
misconduct is a secondary purpose of Miranda).
Because the Miranda Court did not explicitly articulate a deterrence goal as motivating its
decision, many commentators have concluded that it was, therefore, not an important value
being protected in the Court's fashioning of the fifth amendment safeguards. For a hypotheti-
cal illustrating that "deterrence of particular methods of interrogation was not a primary goal
of the Miranda Court," see Gardner, supra note 8, at 454 n. 167 (emphasis in original). See
also Berger, supra note 8, at 201, 203 (Miranda "focuses upon a broader interest in protecting
the accused's constitutional privilege rather than solely controlling state abuses"). But see
Sonenshein, supra note 39, at 415 ("the Court [in Miranda] intended by its exclusionary rule to
deter illegal police behavior"); George, The Fruits of Miranda: Scope of the Exclusionary
Rule, 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 478, 489 (1967) ("[t]he [Miranda] Court's social objective is con-
trol of the police").
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ment.6 6 Regarding the coerced confession doctrine's rationale of ensuring
credible evidence, the Miranda Court, except for cursory mention in a foot-
note, did not articulate this purpose as a value supporting its holding.6 7
Therefore, the result in Miranda may be explained on the basis of the
Court's preference for those values perceived as inherent in the fifth amend-
ment, safeguarding an accusatorial criminal justice system and preserving
individual dignity and free will, over those previously identified as the ratio-
nales underlying the coerced confession doctrine, deterring illegal police be-
havior and obtaining reliable testimonial evidence.
The Miranda Court ascribed, as an indispensable protection of the fifth
amendment privilege, a constitutional basis to its warnings mandate.6' The
Court stated that "[t]he requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a
fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege. ... ,69 Thus,
the Court concluded that to comport with the requirements of the fifth
amendment, the police must apprise a suspect in custody of his constitu-
tional rights before they may interrogate him.7 ° In so concluding, the Court
66. Those interests are the preservation of the accusatory nature of the criminal justice
system and the protection of the individual's free will and dignity. See supra notes 62-63 and
accompanying text. See also Gardner, supra note 8, at 454 ("the Court appeared to treat such
deterrence only as a means to the end of protecting [the other] interests").
67. The Court mentioned only briefly in a footnote, "[i]nterrogation procedures may even
give rise to a false confession." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455 n.24. See Gardner, supra note 8, at
451 ("[tlhe Miranda Court did not explicitly address... reliability of evidence, as a goal of the
privilege").
68. See, e.g., Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the
Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1208-10 (1971) (the
Miranda warnings are constitutionally based). But see Schrock, Welsh & Collins, supra note
63, at 1, 15-19 ("[m]uch of the present doctrinal confusion [surrounding the Miranda decision]
is traceable to the Miranda opinion itself-to the Court's failure to make explicit the fifth
amendment analysis underlying its holding").
69. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. Accordingly, statements obtained without full compliance
with Miranda are prohibited by the Constitution. There exists considerable debate as to
whether the Constitution prohibits only use of the illegally obtained statements or also prohib-
its the act of obtaining compelled statements. Compare Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308,
316 (1976) (holding that inmate's silence at disciplinary proceeding could not be used against
him), and Gardner, supra note 8, at 452 (use of compelled statements against an accused "is
the gravamen of a violation of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination"), and
Ritchie, Compulsion That Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court's Definition, 61
MINN. L. REV. 383, 413 (1977) (a constitutional violation occurs only when an incriminating
statement is used in a criminal proceeding), with Stone, supra note 5, at 139-40 ("[t]he privilege
guards not only against the use of statements elicited by compulsion, but also against the very
act of compelling such statements whether or not they are ever actually used in a criminal
case").
70. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478. "[W]hen an individual is taken into custody or other-
wise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to
questioning, . . . [p]rocedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege." Id. at
478-79 (emphasis added).
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recognized that the fifth amendment protects individuals not only from ac-
tual compulsion as defined by the coerced confession doctrine,71 but also
from compulsion presumed to exist as a function of the coercive nature of
custodial interrogation.
7 2
Notwithstanding the Miranda Court's determination to provide an objec-
tive, "bright line" standard for police agents and courts to follow," the pre-
cise scope of its exclusionary rule was not explicitly defined. Thus, whether,
in addition to statements obtained in violation of its strictures, Miranda also
mandated the exclusion of evidence derived from those statements was un-
clear.74 Seemingly supporting the interpretation of Miranda's exclusionary
rule as encompassing derivative evidence is the Court's assertion that "un-
less and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution
at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against
[the defendant]." 7 Although this unresolved derivative evidence issue was
raised and argued by the parties three years after Miranda in Orozco v.
71. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
72. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 476. See also supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 49, 57 and accompanying text.
74. See Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L.
REV. 579, 612 (1968) ("Miranda did not explicitly concern itself with the fruits of a confession
obtained absent the required warnings"); Comment, Miranda Without Warning: Derivative
Evidence as Forbidden Fruit, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 325, 329 (1974) ("[i]t remains an open
question whether Miranda mandates the exclusion of derivative evidence rooted in a Miranda
violation"); George, supra note 65, at 486 ("[a] key issue... is whether derivative evidence is
also specifically declared to be outlawed by the Miranda decision itself"); Wingo, Rewriting
Mapp and Miranda: A Preference for Due Process, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 219, 230 (1983) ("[a]
constitutionally .. .troublesome issue is the admissibility of other evidence obtained as a
result of statements taken in violation of Miranda").
75. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (emphasis added). Language in Justice Clark's dissenting
opinion supports this construction: "The Court... holds that failure to follow the new pro-
cedures requires inexorably the exclusion of any statement by the accused, as well as the fruits
thereof." Id. at 500 (Clark, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Furthermore, Westover v.
United States, 384 U.S. 494 (1966), one of the companion cases to Miranda, may lend support
to application of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to Miranda violations. In Westover,
the challenged "fruit" of the illegal interrogation was a waiver. The defendant had been inter-
rogated by police for fourteen hours without being advised of his rights. Id. at 496. Subse-
quently, he was questioned by the FBI, after being warned, regarding two crimes unrelated to
that being investigated by the police. The defendant then signed a confession to the two crimes
that were the subject of the FBI interrogation. Id. at 495. Notwithstanding administration of
the warnings, the Court held the confessions inadmissible, reasoning that the FBI interrogators
"were the beneficiaries of the pressure applied by the local in-custody interrogation." Id. at
497. The Court went on to note that "fin these circumstances the giving of warnings alone
was not sufficient to protect the privilege [against self-incrimination]." Id. It appears that the
Westover Court treated the defective waiver as an inadmissible "fruit" of the prior illegal inter-
rogation. See Pitler, supra note 74, at 612-13. See also Pye, Interrogation of Criminal Defend-
ants-Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 169, 216 (1966); Comment,
supra note 74, at 330.
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Texas,7 6 the Court's opinion in that case did not address it,77 and the issue
thus remained unsettled.
C. Miranda's Progeny: A Reinterpretation by the Burger Court
Leaving Miranda fully intact, subsequent decisions by the Warren Court
involving Miranda related solely to its applicability in various factual con-
texts.7" With the appointment of Chief Justice Burger and three new Associ-
ate Justices between 1969 and 1971, 79 however, the viewpoint of the Court
changed significantly regarding Miranda's underlying principles and the
general scope of the self-incrimination clause. A review of several subse-
quent decisions will demonstrate that the Court, as a basis for gradually
narrowing the scope of the Miranda doctrine, emphasized values not deemed
significant by the Miranda Court."°
1. Impeachment Use Limitation
The first case narrowing the scope of Miranda arose in 1971. Harris v.
New York"1 presented the question whether a defendant's statement, made
to the police absent complete Miranda warnings, could be used to impeach
his credibility at trial.82 In Harris, the defendant was arrested for selling
76. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
77. See Comment, supra note 74, at 326 n.12.
78. The Court decided four cases involving Miranda before Chief Justice Warren's retire-
ment in 1969: Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969) (held Miranda not applicable to
retrials beginning after the date of that decision); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (held
Miranda applicable to interrogations conducted in suspect's home); Mathis v. United States,
391 U.S. 1 (1968) (held Miranda applicable to interrogation of suspect for a tax offense while
he was imprisoned for another unrelated offense); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966)
(held Miranda applicable only to cases in which the trials commence after the date of that
decision).
79. Warren Burger was appointed Chief Justice on June 23, 1969, replacing Chief Justice
Earl Warren upon his retirement. Justice Harry Blackmun was appointed to the Court in 1969
and Justices Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist in 1971. These three Associate Justices
replaced Abe Fortas, Hugo Black, and John Marshall Harlan, respectively. Together, these
changes resulted in the replacement of two of the original five-member majority in Miranda.
80. See, e.g., Sonenshein, supra note 39, at 407; Stone, supra note 5, at 101; Gardner,
supra note 8, at 455. But see Sonenshein, supra note 39, at 408, 447-62, where the author
asserts that two recent Burger Court cases appear to revitalize Miranda inasmuch as they
favored the defendant: (1) Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), holding that a confession
obtained after the defendant had previously invoked his right to counsel but before counsel has
been made available to him must be excluded under Miranda; and (2) Estelle v. Smith, 451
U.S. 454 (1981), holding that the fifth amendment prohibits use of psychiatric testimony, de-
rived from the defendant's disclosures, at the penalty stage of a bifurcated capital trial, where
the defendant was not first given Miranda warnings.
81. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
82. Id. at 222.
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heroin to an undercover police officer. Harris made several incriminating
statements during the interrogation, after having received all the Miranda
warnings except that concerning the right to appointed counsel. Although
Harris' statements were not used by the prosecution in its case-in-chief in
accordance with Miranda,83 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,
held that statements obtained without benefit of the complete Miranda
warnings could be used to impeach the defendant's testimony.
8 4
Initially, Chief Justice Burger noted that Harris made no claim that his
statements were "coerced" or otherwise "involuntary," in traditional, pre-
Miranda terms.85 Recognizing that Miranda contained language expressly
prohibiting impeachment use of such statements,86 Chief Justice Burger dis-
missed the discussion in Miranda as mere dicta, "not at all necessary to the
Court's holding" and so not controlling. s7 The Court then invoked its deci-
sion in Walder v. United States,88 a fourth amendment case holding that the
exclusionary rule is not applicable to evidence used for impeachment pur-
poses, and concluded that Harris' statements could be used for impeachment
purposes despite the defect in the Miranda warnings.89
The Harris Court further interpreted Miranda's exclusionary rule as being
founded solely upon a deterrence theory, 9° a characterization that enabled
83. Id. at 223-24.
84. Id. at 226.
85. Id. at 224. But, according to Miranda, statements obtained absent the requisite warn-
ings are by definition coerced and, therefore, involuntary. See supra notes 52-55 and accompa-
nying text. The unarticulated assumption of Chief Justice Burger's statement is that there is a
difference between coercion resulting from a Miranda violation and actual coercion in pre-
Miranda terms-an assumption that was expressly rejected by the Miranda Court. See Wingo,
supra note 74, at 232.
86. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. "The privilege against self-incrimination protects the
individual from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish
degrees of incrimination." Id. (emphasis added). More to the point, the Miranda Court con-
tinued, "statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to im-
peach his testimony at trial. . . . These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense
of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for
any other statement." Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
87. Harris, 401 U.S. at 224. But see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42 (the Court deliberately
intended to address issues not specifically raised by the case). See also Stone, supra note 5, at
107. As one commentator remarked, "[t]he Burger Court misstated the meaning of Miranda
by focusing on an unnecessary and arbitrary factual distinction. Then, the Court transformed
this irrelevant factual distinction into a basis for artificially limiting [Miranda] to its facts."
Sonenshein, supra note 39, at 419.
88. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
89. Harris, 401 U.S. at 224-25, 226. For a criticism of the Court's reliance on Walder, see
Stone, supra note 5, at 108-11.
90. See Harris, 401 U.S. at 225. But see id. at 231 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[t]he objec-
tive of deterring improper police conduct is only part of the larger objective of safeguarding the
integrity of our adversary system"). See also supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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the Court to narrow Miranda's scope both in Harris and in subsequent cases.
Applying the deterrence theory, the Harris Court reasoned that, because
"sufficient deterrence flows when evidence in question is made unavailable to
the prosecution['s] . . . case in chief," there was no reason to exclude Har-
ris' statements for impeachment purposes. 9' Thus, the Harris Court con-
cluded, testimony should be excluded only if it would deter police from
employing improper methods of interrogation. Such deterrence was suffi-
cient in the instant case by the exclusion of Harris' statements from the pros-
ecution's case-in-chief.92
2. Reinterpreting Miranda's Constitutional Basis
Although the Harris Court did not specifically address the question of the
admissibility of the "fruits" of a Miranda violation, its reliance on a deter-
rence theory of exclusion in Miranda contexts could provide the basis for
admitting the "fruits" of the violation. The reasoning of Harris suggests that
sufficient deterrence flows from the exclusion of the evidence obtained di-
rectly as a result of the violation, and that there is no reason to exclude the
"fruits" as well. Indeed, this very issue was presented three years later in
Michigan v. Tucker.9 3 Although the Court decided Tucker on narrower
grounds, it strongly implied that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine
does not apply to Miranda violations.94
In Tucker, as in Harris, the defendant was arrested and questioned by
police without having been advised of his right to appointed counsel. Dur-
ing his interrogation for assault and rape, Tucker stated that at the time of
the crime he had been with a Robert Henderson. Henderson, when con-
tacted by the police, discredited Tucker's alibi and subsequently testified
against him at trial.9" The interrogation of Tucker occurred prior to the
Miranda decision, but the trial took place afterwards.96 The issue con-
fronting the Court was whether, in addition to Tucker's exculpatory state-
91. Harris, 401 U.S. at 225.
92. See id. But, according to the dissent and several commentators, the majority's conclu-
sion, rather than deterring police from violating Miranda, provides them an incentive for doing
so. See id. at 232 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (majority's holding undermines the objective of
preserving an accusatorial criminal justice system and undercuts the deterrence rationale). See
also Sonenshein, supra note 39, at 421 (the Harris conclusion "provides a clear incentive to the
police to violate Miranda"); Stone, supra note 5, at 113 ("Harris ... seems to carry at least
the potential seriously to undercut the incentive of the police to comply with the dictates of
Miranda"); Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 68, at 1218-21; Kent, Harris v. New York: The
Death Knell of Miranda and Walder?, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 357, 360-61 (1971).
93. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
94. Id. at 447.
95. Id. at 436-37.
96. Id. at 435.
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ments, the "fruit" of his statements (i.e., Henderson's testimony) must also
be suppressed." Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held Hender-
son's testimony admissible as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief.98
Justice Rehnquist first considered whether the police violated Tucker's
constitutional right against compulsory self-incrimination or whether they
instead violated only the rules designed to protect that right.99 Recounting
the language in Miranda that the Constitution does not mandate "adherence
to any particular solution"''  to dissipate the inherently compelling atmos-
phere of custodial interrogations, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the Mi-
randa warnings were merely "procedural safeguards .. . not themselves
rights protected by the Constitution."'' Further, comparing the Tucker
facts with those traditionally involving actual coercion, Justice Rehnquist
determined that Tucker's statements could not be characterized as involun-
tary. 10 2 On that basis, he concluded that the police did not violate Tucker's
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.103 Rather, the police con-
duct "departed only from the prophylactic standards. . . laid down by this
Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege.'' °4 Thus, the Tucker Court
reaffirmed the Harris implication that only involuntary statements, as de-
fined by traditional standards, violate the self-incrimination clause of the
fifth amendment.'o 5
Having denied that the Miranda warnings are constitutionally required,
Justice Rehnquist then considered whether Henderson's testimony must be
suppressed as tainted "fruit" of Tucker's statements made in violation of
97. Id.
98. Id. at 452.
99. Id. at 439.
100. Id. at 444 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
101. Id. Justice Rehnquist neglected, however, to note the Miranda Court's further state-
ment that "unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising
accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it,
the [enunciated] safeguards must be observed." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
102. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444-45. Justice Rehnquist stated:
A comparison of the facts in this case with the historical circumstances underlying
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination strongly indicates that the police
conduct here did not deprive respondent of his privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination. . . . Certainly no one could contend that the interrogation faced by
respondent bore any resemblance to the historical practices at which the right against
compulsory self-incrimination was aimed.
Id. at 444. Thus, the Tucker Court ignored the Miranda premises that custodial interrogation
is inherently compelling and that any statements obtained absent the requisite warnings must
be presumed coerced, and hence, involuntary. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
103. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444.
104. Id. at 446.




Miranda.0 6 He commenced by referring to the Court's holding in Wong
Sun v. United States, 7 that evidence obtained through statements made by
a defendant whose fourth amendment rights had been violated must be sup-
pressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree."108 However, Justice Rehnquist rea-
soned that, because Miranda violations are not constitutional violations,
Tucker's constitutional rights were not abridged. Therefore, he concluded
that Wong Sun was not applicable. 9
Finding "no controlling precedent," Justice Rehnquist set out to resolve
the issue by balancing the government's interest in placing before the jury all
pertinent and reliable evidence and society's interest in prosecuting guilty
criminals against the deterrent effect of excluding Henderson's testimony. 10
Noting that, in fourth amendment search and seizure situations, the "prime
purpose" of the exclusionary rule is deterrence of future unlawful conduct
by police, Justice Rehnquist suggested that this rationale, "[i]n a proper
case," would also seem applicable in a fifth amendment context."' He con-
cluded that where, as here, the police act in "good faith," the deterrence goal
in excluding evidence so obtained would not be furthered." 2 On this reason-
ing then, as in Harris, Justice Rehnquist tipped the balance in favor of ad-
mitting Henderson's testimony, notwithstanding the fact that it was the clear
"fruit" of a Miranda violation and that a balancing approach was explicitly
rejected in Miranda."3
Although Justice Rehnquist's analysis would seem to have resolved the
question of whether evidence derived from statements obtained in violation
of Miranda must be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree," he expressly
stated that he was not deciding that broad question. 14 Justice Rehnquist
106. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 439, 446.
107. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
108. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445. See supra note 15.
109. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446.
110. Id. at 446, 450. Justice Rehnquist failed to note that the Court in Miranda expressly
rejected such a "balancing" approach. See supra text accompanying note 58.
111. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446-47.
112. Id. at 447 ("[w]here the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however,
the deterrence rationale loses much of its force"). A "good faith" exception to the fourth
amendment was not recognized until 1984. See United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
However, prior to Leon, several Supreme Court Justices had advocated such an exception.
See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 501, 538 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring; White, J.,
dissenting); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 612 (1975) (Powell, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 418 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). For a
critique of the application of a "good faith" exception to the Miranda doctrine, see generally
Gardner, supra note 8.
113. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 452. See also supra notes 58, 110 and accompanying text.
114. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447.
1985]
Catholic University Law Review
was able to sidestep that crucial issue, deeming it "significant" that the inter-
rogation of Tucker preceded the decision in Miranda.'1 5 Thus, after Tucker,
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine's applicability to Miranda viola-
tions remained unclear. Even so, Tucker provided solid dicta for future res-
olution of the issue.
3. Impeachment Use Revisited
In Oregon v. Hass,"6 the Court again considered the issue of impeach-
ment use of statements obtained in violation of Miranda's strictures. The
result in that case appears to justify Justice Brennan's fear in Harris that that
decision actually provides encouragement, rather than deterrence, for the
police to violate Miranda. "7 In Hass, the defendant was arrested in connec-
tion with the theft of several bicycles. After receiving the full Miranda
warnings, Hass admitted to taking two of the bicycles, but claimed he had
returned one. A police officer then placed Hass in the police car and started
to drive to the location where Hass said he left the stolen bicycle. On the
way, however, Hass stated that he wished to telephone his attorney. The
police officer replied that Hass could contact his attorney when they reached
the police station, and they continued on to the place where the theft had
occurred. Hass then identified the garages from which the bicycles were
taken and the place where he left one of them."
8
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in Hass, ruled in favor of ad-
mitting, for impeachment purposes, the evidence obtained after Hass had
requested to contact his attorney. 1 9 In so holding, he applied the identical
balancing test used in Harris in order to achieve a like result.' 2° Justice
115. Id.
116. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
117. See supra note 92. See also Gardner, supra note 8, at 456 n.176; Sonenshein, supra
note 39, at 421; Stone, supra note 5, at 129.
118. Hass, 420 U.S. at 715-17.
119. Id. at 723-24.
120. See id. at 722-23. Relying exclusively on Harris, Justice Blackmun stated:
We see no valid distinction to be made in the application of the principles of Harris
to that case and to Hass' case....
I . . Again, the impeaching material would provide valuable aid to the jury in
assessing the defendant's credibility; again, "the benefits of this process should not be
lost," . . . ; and, again, making the deterrent-effect assumption, there is sufficient
deterrence when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in
its case in chief. If all this sufficed for the result in Harris, it supports and demands a
like result in Hass' case ....
I . . The effect of inadmissibility in the Harris case and in this case is the same:
inadmissibility would pervert the consititutional right into a right to falsify free from
the embarrassment of impeachment evidence from the defendant's own mouth.
Id. (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 225).
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Blackmun conceded, however, that because the police officer in Hass, unlike
in Harris and Tucker, seemingly acted in bad faith, the deterrence goal
might not be well served by the admission of the evidence at issue.' 2 ' He
nevertheless concluded that this "speculative possibility" of bad faith did not
necessitate the reconsideration or narrowing of Harris, and declared that
"the balance was struck in Harris, and we are not disposed to change it
now."'
1 22
For the next nine years, the Burger Court's concern with the Miranda
doctrine centered primarily upon the interpretation of its requirements,
rather than upon the question of admissibility of evidence stemming from a
Miranda violation. 123  Although some of these cases have arguably ex-
panded the Miranda doctrine since Harris,1 24 none had any effect on the
issue of admissibility of "fruits" derived from an initial violation of Miranda
as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief.
4. "Public Safety" Exception
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided New York v. Quarles,1 25 again con-
cerning the issue of admissibility in the wake of a Miranda violation.
Quarles, however, unlike its predecessors Harris, Tucker, and Hass, 26 in-
volved the admissibility of the defendant's own statements as part of the
prosecution's case-in-chief. At first glance, Quarles appeared to be con-
trolled by the holding in Miranda that statements obtained absent the requi-
site warnings during custodial interrogation must be excluded from the
121. Justice Blackmun stated, "[o]ne might concede that when proper Miranda warnings
have been given, and the officer then continues interrogation after the suspect asks for an
attorney, the officer may be said to have little to lose and perhaps something to gain by way of
possibly uncovering impeaching material." Id. at 723.
122. Id.
123. The Court, during that time, was engaged in deciding the following types of issues:
(1) interpretation of "interrogation," see, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980); (2) interpretation of "waiver," see, e.g., Fare v. Michael
C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); (3) meaning of "custo-
dial interrogation," see, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977); Beckwith v. United
States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976); (4) effect of invocation of right to remain silent, see, e.g., Doyle v.
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
124. See Sonenshein, supra note 39, at 447-62 (discussion of two cases in the 1980's that
have revitalized Miranda).
125. 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
126. Harris, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), and Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), deal with the admissibility
of evidence for impeachment purposes in cross-examination. See supra notes 81-92, 116-22
and accompanying text. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), involves the exclusion of evidence de-
rived from the defendant's inadmissible statements. See supra notes 93-115 and accompanying
text.
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prosecution's case-in-chief. 127 However, the Quarles case resulted in the first
exception to Miranda's per se exclusionary rule. 28
In Quarles, Officer Kraft, responding to the report of a rape by a man
carrying a gun, entered an all-night supermarket in pursuit of the suspect.
Quarles, upon seeing Kraft, fled to the rear of the store and down another
aisle, momentarily out of Kraft's view. Kraft, chasing Quarles with his gun
drawn, apprehended him. As three other police officers approached with
their guns drawn, Kraft handcuffed and frisked Quarles. Noticing an empty
shoulder holster, Kraft questioned him as to the location of the gun without
first administering the Miranda warnings. 129 Quarles replied "the gun is
over there," nodding toward some empty cartons nearby.130 Kraft then re-
trieved the loaded gun from one of the cartons and arrested Quarles. After
administering the Miranda warnings, Kraft continued questioning Quarles,
eliciting from him an admission that he owned the gun. 3 ' The lower courts,
declining to recognize an exigency exception to Miranda, held that the state-
ment, "the gun is over there," must be suppressed in light of the Miranda
violation. The lower courts also suppressed the statements made subsequent
to the warnings, ruling that they had been tainted by the initial Miranda
violation. 132 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that despite the obvious
Miranda violation, the facts of the case mandated an exception to Miranda's
warning requirement because the police questioning was motivated by a con-
cern for public safety.' 3 3
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began by discussing the fifth
amendment's privilege against self-incrimination and its extension in Mi-
randa to persons subjected to custodial interrogation. "' Noting that the
fifth amendment does not require exclusion of all incriminating statements,
he reaffirmed the majority position in Tucker that the Miranda warnings are
merely measures to protect the fifth amendment privilege, rather than being
actual constitutional rights. ' 3 1 Asserting that there was no claim that
Quarles' statements had been coerced in traditional terms,' 36 he concluded
127. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
128. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2634. The Quarles Court adopted a "public safety" exception to
Miranda.
129. Id. at 2629-30.
130. Id. at 2630.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. Id. at 2632. The Court held that "on these facts there is a 'public safety' exception to
the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted
into evidence." Id.
134. Id. at 2630-31.
135. Id. at 2631. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
136. See 104 S. Ct. at 2631. This statement by the majority implicitly assumes that the fifth
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that the only issue before the Court was whether justification existed under
the circumstances for Kraft's initial failure to administer the Miranda warn-
ings.137 Although agreeing with the lower court's finding that Quarles was
in custody at the time of the questioning, Justice Rehnquist summarily re-
jected any presumption of coercion flowing from the absence of the Miranda
warnings. 1
38
Next, notwithstanding the Miranda Court's explicit rejection of a balanc-
ing test, Justice Rehnquist characterized that decision as the result of a cost/
benefit balance in which the social cost of fewer convictions was outweighed
by protection of the fifth amendment privilege.' 39 He reasoned that, in the
instant case, the potential danger emanating from the existence of a con-
cealed gun in a supermarket justified tipping the scales in the opposite direc-
tion. " Thus, having concluded that an exigent circumstance existed in this
case, Justice Rehnquist fashioned a "public safety" exception to the Miranda
rule. 4 ' Justifying application of a cost/benefit balancing approach to Mi-
randa, he employed an analogy to the exclusionary rule of the fourth amend-
ment, recollecting that an exigency exception has long been recognized by
the Court in search and seizure contexts. 142
amendment requires the exclusion only of statements that are obtained through actual coer-
cion. See also supra notes 85, 105 and accompanying text.
137. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2631.
138. Id. at 2631 & n.5. In a footnote, Justice Rehnquist stated, "[tioday we merely reject
the only argument that respondent has raised to support the exclusion of his statement, that
the statement must be presumed compelled because of Office Kraft's failure to read him his
Miranda warnings. Id. at 2631 n.5 (emphasis in original). This rejection of the coercion pre-
sumption is in direct conflict with the premise on which Miranda is based. See Miranda, 384
U.S. at 467-68. See also supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
139. See Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2632. In referring to the Miranda majority, Justice Rehn-
quist stated that it "apparently felt that whatever the cost to society in terms of fewer convic-
tions of guilty suspects, that cost would simply have to be borne in the interest of enlarged
protection for the Fifth Amendment privilege." Id But see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. See
also supra note 110 and text accompanying note 58.
140. See Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2632-33. Justice Rehnquist asserted that "Officer Kraft
needed an answer to his question not simply to make his case against Quarles but to insure
that further danger to the public did not result from the concealment of the gun in a public
area." Id.
141. Id. at 2632. But, as Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent, there existed no actual
danger to the public on these facts. See id. at 2642-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Similarly, Justice Arthur Goldberg has commented that, "[i]nasmuch as [Quarles] was
handcuffed and a body search indicated that he had no other weapons, the public safety expla-
nation is not credible. The only tenable conclusion is that the Court is determined to limit or
overrule Miranda by erosion." Goldberg, supra note 63, at 180.
142. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2630 & n.3. Justice Rehnquist based his analogy on two
grounds. First, cost/benefit analyses are employed in fourth amendment contexts because the
exclusionary rule associated with that amendment is not constitutionally mandated, see, e.g.,
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976), and
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Justice Rehnquist conceded that the "public safety" ruling necessarily di-
minishes, to some extent, the desired clarity of the Miranda requirements.1
4 3
Recognizing the importance of maintaining a "workable rule" to guide po-
lice officers in their day-to-day experiences, Justice Rehnquist characterized
the Court's ruling as a "narrow exception."'" He thus concluded that rec-
ognition of a "public safety" exception lessens the need for "on-the-scene
balancing" by police officers because they possess the ability, as evidenced by
the facts of the instant case, to recognize exigencies and to limit their ques-
tioning to securing the public's safety. 45 As a result, Justice Rehnquist pos-
ited that the exception, rather than hindering police officers, will enable
them instinctively to handle exigent situations posing a threat to public
safety. 1
46
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, dissented, argu-
ing that, in addition to Quarles' statements, the gun should also have been
excluded.' 4 7 Justice Marshall contended that, under the rule of Wong
Sun,148 the gun should be suppressed as evidence derived directly from the
illegal source of Quarles' statements before the Miranda warnings. 149 Not-
ing that the Court had recently applied the Wong Sun rule to fifth amend-
ment violations,' 5 ° he argued that the lower court was correct in ruling that
the gun was inadmissible as the "tainted fruit" of the illegal interrogation. ,51
is satisfied by a showing of reasonableness, see, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394
(1978); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976). Second, the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule is judicially imposed in order to deter violations of fourth amendment rights.
See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). In contrast, however, the fifth
amendment exclusionary rule does not embody either one of these principles. See supra notes
62-66, 68-70 and accompanying text.
In addition, although not explicitly emphasized by Justice Rehnquist, traces of the deter-
rence rationale adopted in Harris offer justification for the majority's cost/benefit approach in
creating a "public safety" exception.
143. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2633.
144. Id.
145. Id. In the Court's words, "[t]he exception will not be difficult for police officers to
apply because in each case it will be circumscribed by the exigency which justifies it. We think
police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to se-
cure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely to elicit testimo-
nial evidence from a suspect." Id.
146. See id.
147. Id. at 2649 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
148. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). See supra note 15 and text accompanying notes 107-08.
149. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2649 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
150. See Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2508 (1984).
151. See Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2649-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting). However, Justice Mar-
shall noted that in light of the Court's recent discussion in Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501,
2508 (1984), construing Wong Sun as permitting the introduction of "tainted" evidence that
would have been inevitably discovered by the government, the gun might be deemed admissi-
ble by the lower court. Because this decision was announced after the lower court's ruling in
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By way of summary, Under the coerced confession doctrine that preceded
Miranda, the Court employed a case-by-case, balancing approach to deter-
mine the admissibility of alleged coerced confessions. The Miranda Court
rejected the coerced confession doctrine, and established an objective stan-
dard to be applied to all statements obtained during custodial interrogations
conducted without the prior administration of prescribed warnings. Subse-
quently, the Court gradually began narrowing the Miranda doctrine by at-
tributing to that decision values not deemed significant by the Miranda
Court, employing a balancing approach explicitly rejected in Miranda, and
questioning the constitutional basis for the Miranda warnings.
After sidestepping, for roughly twenty-five years, the derivative evidence
issue involving Miranda violations, the Supreme Court in 1985 finally under-
took to resolve this issue, particularly as it applies in a successive confession
context. It is against this background of Supreme Court case law-the pre-
Miranda and Miranda decisions, the Burger Court's treatment of post-Mi-
randa cases, and the charges of dissenters and commentators-that the rea-
soning and impact of this recent decision must be analyzed.
II. OREGON V. ELSTAD" ADMITTING THE "FRUITS" OF A MIRANDA
VIOLATION IN A CONSECUTIVE CONFESSION CONTEXT
A. Announcement of a New Rule
In Oregon v. Elstad,5 2 the Supreme Court for the first time resolved the
issue of whether the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment man-
dates exclusion of a suspect's confession, made after proper Miranda warn-
ings, as tainted evidence derived from a prior, unwarned admission.'
53
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, held that a suspect who gives an
unwarned confession in uncoerced, albeit custodial, surroundings may sub-
sequently give a valid confession under the fifth amendment after properly
receiving the Miranda warnings.' 5 4 Although the majority purported to rec-
ognize Miranda's presumption of coercion in a custodial interrogation set-
ting absent the requisite warnings, an analysis of Elstad demonstrates that it
reinterpreted and limited that presumption through a narrow reading of the
fifth amendment.
Relying heavily on the Court's prior decision in Michigan v. Tucker,'55
Quarles, he therefore would have remanded this issue to be reconsidered in view of Nix v.
Williams. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2649-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152. 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).
153. Id. at 1290.
154. Id. at 1298.
155. 417 U.S. 433 (1974); see supra notes 93-115 and accompanying text.
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Justice O'Connor concluded that the Wong Sun "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine does not apply to a second voluntary confession where the initial
confession was obtained without Miranda warnings. 56 Noting that applica-
tion of the "fruit" doctrine requires the suppression of evidence derived from
a constitutional violation, Justice O'Connor recalled the Court's decisions in
Tucker and Quarles,' depriving the Miranda warnings of a constitutional
basis.' 58 She distinguished "procedural" violations of Miranda from fourth
amendment violations, "which have traditionally mandated a broad applica-
tion of the 'fruits' doctrine," and asserted that, because there was no viola-
tion of Elstad's constitutional rights, the Wong Sun "fruits" doctrine was
inapposite. 5 9
Justice O'Connor interpreted the language of the fifth amendment as re-
quiring the exclusion only of actually "compelled testimony" from the prose-
cution's case-in-chief.' ° While acknowledging that Miranda mandates that
failure to administer the requisite warnings results in an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of compulsion, she reasoned that such presumption "does not re-
quire that [subsequent] statements and their fruits be discarded as inherently
tainted."'' Thus, she maintained, although Elstad's initial unwarned ad-
mission must be suppressed under Miranda, his subsequent statement is not
governed by the Miranda presumption.'
62
Justice O'Connor then turned to the rationale in Tucker to determine
whether exclusion of Elstad's written confession would further the values
underlying the fifth amendment. 63 Identifying the fifth amendment pur-
poses supporting admission of the witness' testimony in Tucker as deterring
police misconduct and ensuring reliable evidence, she posited that "this rea-
soning applies with equal force" to Elstad's written confession.' 64 Accord-
ingly, applying the Tucker rationale to the instant case, she concluded that,
absent any actual coercion or "improper tactics," the dual rationales of de-
terrence and trustworthiness would not be furthered by excluding Elstad's
156. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1291-93.
157. 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984); see supra notes 99-104, 135 and accompanying text.
158. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1291-92.
159. Id. at 1292-93.
160. Id. at 1292 (emphasis in original).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1292-93.
163. Id. at 1293.
164. Id. Justice O'Connor asserted this to be true even though the evidence in question
was the defendant's "own voluntary testimony" rather than a "witness," as in Tucker, or a
physical piece of evidence. Id. But see supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (deterrence





Having decided that Elstad's written confession, absent actual coercion,
could not be excluded as tainted by his prior unwarned admission, Justice
O'Connor undertook to determine its admissibility based on whether it was
"knowingly and voluntarily made."' 66  In resolving that question, she
pointed out that the Miranda presumption of coercion does not necessarily
assume that actual coercion has taken place.' 67 She concluded that where
there is no coercion in fact, "a careful and thorough administration of Mi-
randa warnings serves to cure the condition that rendered the unwarned
statement inadmissible." 1 68 She asserted that proper administration of the
requisite warnings serves to apprise the suspect adequately of the knowledge
necessary to enable him to make an informed decision as to whether to re-
main silent.' 69 Therefore, Justice O'Connor concluded that any statements
subsequently made should "ordinarily" be viewed as voluntary. 70
Turning to the lower court's reliance on United States v. Bayer'7' as the
basis for its finding that the coercive psychological impact of initially having
"let the cat out of the bag" tainted Elstad's second confession, Justice
O'Connor asserted that the lower court's adoption of this expansive interpre-
tation of coercion under the fifth amendment was unwarranted.1 72 This
broad interpretation, she stated, has the effect of insulating a suspect, who
made prior unwarned statements, from the use of any statements made sub-
sequent to an informed waiver of his privilege to remain silent. She reasoned
that such insulation significantly increases the cost of law enforcement while
providing little additional protection of the suspect's fifth amendment inter-
165. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1293.
166. Id. at 1294.
167. Id. The Court noted that "failure of police to administer Miranda warnings does not
mean that the statements received have actually been coerced, but only that courts will pre-
sume the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination has not been intelligently exercised."
Id. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457).
168. Id.
169. Id. In the Court's words, "[t]he warning conveys the relevant information and there-
after the suspect's choice whether to exercise his privilege to remain silent should ordinarily be
viewed as an 'act of free will.' " Id.
170. Id. See supra note 169.
171. 331 U.S. 532 (1947). The Bayer Court stated, with respect to successive confessions:
Of course, after an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no
matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and
practical disadvantages of having confessed. He can never get the cat back in the
bag. The secret is out for good. In such a sense, a later confession always may be
looked upon as fruit of the first. But this Court has never gone so far as to hold that
making a confession under circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually disables
the confessor from making a usable one after those conditions have been removed.
Id. at 540-41.
172. Elstad 105 S. Ct. at 1295.
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est against the adverse use of his own compelled testimony. 7 3 Thus, Justice
O'Connor concluded that where neither confession is actually coerced, "lit-
tle justification exists for permitting the highly probative evidence of a volun-
tary confession to be irretrievably lost to the factfinder."' 74
By concluding that an unwarned confession, absent actual coercion or im-
proper tactics, does not justify a presumption of compulsion,' 75 Justice
O'Connor fashioned a distinction between the specific consequences emanat-
ing from actual coercion and the less certain consequences emanating from
voluntary admission of a "guilty secret" in answer to an uncoerced, albeit
unwarned, question.'7 6 Characterizing Elstad's confession as of the latter
type, she identified "the causal connection between any psychological disad-
vantage" stemming from Elstad's initial admission and his second confession
as "speculative and attenuated at best."' 177 Therefore, she concluded that
the confession at issue was voluntary.'
1 7
As a final matter, Justice O'Connor addressed the effect of the Court's
holding on the Miranda decision. 179 Declaring that "[t]he Court today in no
way retreats from the bright line rule of Miranda," she maintained that the
strictures of Miranda and the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation are fully satisfied in this case by the exclusion of Elstad's initial state-
ment from the prosecution's case-in-chief.' ° Further, asserting that the
values underlying Miranda and the fifth amendment privilege would not be
furthered by imputing taint to statements made after a knowing and volun-
tary waiver, Justice O'Connor eschewed the announcement of a rigid rule
pertaining to consecutive confessions.' Rather than presuming the exist-
ence of coercion in cases in which the suspect's initial admission was volun-
tary but unwarned, Justice O'Connor stated that the question of
admissibility of a subsequent statement must be determined as a function of
173. Id. But see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, where the Court expressly rejected a balancing
approach. See also supra notes 58, 110, 139 and accompanying text.
174. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1295.
175. Id. at 1296. Justice O'Connor concluded that, "absent deliberately coercive or im-
proper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an
unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion." Id.
176. Id. at 1295. In the Court's words:
There is a vast difference between the direct consequences flowing from coercion of
a confession by physical violence or other deliberate means calculated to break the
suspect's will and the uncertain consequences of disclosure of a "guilty secret" freely
given in response to an unwarned but noncoercive question, as in this case.
Id.
177. Id. at 1296.
178. Id.





whether that statement was voluntarily made as well."' 2 She thus urged
courts to assess the question of voluntariness in light of all the relevant facts
surrounding the situation."8 3
Justice Brennan, in a lengthy dissent joined by Justice Marshall, criticized
the majority's decision as "deliver[ing] a potentially crippling blow to Mi-
randa" by depriving Miranda violations of the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
remedy. 8 4 Specifically, Justice Brennan found fault with two conclusions
reached by the majority. First, he criticized the majority's adoption of a new
ruling, that administration of the Miranda warnings serves automatically to
dissipate any taint resulting from a prior uncoerced confession, as one that
misrepresents prior Supreme Court decisions and "altogether ignores the
practical realities of custodial interrogation that have led nearly every lower
court to reject [the majority's] simplistic reasoning." ' 5 Further, he attacked
as "startling and unprecedented" the majority's conclusion that suppression
of the "fruits" of a Miranda violation is not mandated either by the fifth
amendment or by the judicial policy of deterrence. 8 6
Regarding the effect that an unwarned admission of guilt should be pre-
sumed to have on a subsequent warned confession, Justice Brennan re-
counted the lower court's reliance on the Bayer "cat out of the bag"
presumption and criticized the fact that the majority's new rule presumes no
causation between an unwarned confession and a later, warned confes-
sion.' 87 He suggested that the Court's claim that such a ruling was in ac-
cordance with lower court treatment of this issue is erroneous, noting that
most such courts have rejected the majority's approach. 88 He argued that
the majority's assertion that recognition of the "cat out of the bag" presump-
tion renders subsequent statements irretrievably lost to the factfinder contra-
dicts Supreme Court precedent on the issue. 8 9 Justice Brennan declared
182. Id. Justice O'Connor determined that "[tihe relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the
second statement was also voluntarily made." Id.
183. Id. In Justice O'Connor's words, "the finder of facts must examine the surrounding
circumstances and the entire course of police conduct with respect to the suspect in evaluating
the voluntariness of statements. The fact that a suspect chooses to speak after being informed
of his rights is, of course, highly probative." Id.
184. Id. at 1299 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1300. See supra note 171.
188. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1300-01. Justice Brennan cited some 46 lower federal and state
courts that have confronted this issue and have concluded "that subsequent confessions are
presumptively tainted by a first confession taken in violation of Miranda and that Miranda
warnings alone cannot dissipate the taint." Id. at 1300-01 & nn.3, 4, 6.
189. Id. at 1302. See, e.g., Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 349 (1968) (subsequent
confessions may be admitted if the prosecution can show that "[c]onsidering the 'totality of the
circumstances,'" there existed a " 'break in the stream of events' ... 'sufficient to insulate' "
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that the reasoning in Supreme Court precedents in this area "reflect an un-
derstanding of the realities of police interrogation," completely ignored by
the majority.'90 Citing and quoting from a multitude of interrogation guides
and manuals used by interrogators, Justice Brennan noted the many and
varied psychological methods by which full confessions are elicited after an
initial admission is made by the suspect. 9 ' He concluded that the majority's
dismissal of the "cat out of the bag" presumption was wholly without
merit. 192
Justice Brennan further argued that the proper approach, applied by most
lower courts in the past, is to presume that a subsequent confession has been
tainted by a previous admission made without the Miranda warnings until
the prosecution demonstrates that the later confession is sufficiently attenu-
ated from the first so as to be free of its coercive effects.' 93 Asserting that the
relevant inquiry in each case is whether the subsequent statement was suffi-
ciently "purged" of the taint resulting from the initial illegality, Justice
Brennan criticized the majority's outright rejection of this "sensitive in-
quiry" and its conclusion that, after the Miranda warnings are given, subse-
the later confession from the coercive effect of the earlier one) (citations omitted); United
States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1947) ("this Court has never gone so far as to hold that
making a confession under circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually disables the con-
fessor from making a usable one after those conditions have been removed"). Justice Brennan
noted in Elstad that such statements are not per se inadmissible, but that the Court has held
that admissibility is a question of whether the prosecution can show that the subsequent state-
ment was made independently of the first. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1302-03.
190. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1303.
191. See id. at 1303-04. The manuals instruct interrogators first to secure an incriminating
admission from a suspect as a psychological tool for subsequently inducing a full confession.
Id. Cf Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-56 (the Court relied upon similar manuals to justify its char-
acterization of the nature of custodial interrogations as inherently coercive). See also supra
text accompanying notes 52-54.
192. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1304-06. Justice Brennan stated that, as a result of the Court's
rejection of the "cat out of the bag" presumption:
Expert interrogators and experienced lower-court judges will be startled, to say the
least, to learn that the connection between multiple confessions is "speculative" and
that a subsequent rendition of Miranda warnings "ordinarily" enables the accused in
these circumstances to exercise his "free will" and to make a "rational and intelligent
choice whether to waive or invoke his rights."
Id. at 1305-06 (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 1294, 1296).
Justice Brennan declared that the majority's holding "marks an evisceration of the estab-
lished fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine," but conceded that it leaves lower courts sufficient
latitude to "combat obvious flouting by authorities of the privilege against self-incrimination."
Id. at 1313. He argued that the majority failed to acknowledge that a Miranda'violation "is
obviously itself an 'improper tactic'" commonly employed precisely for the purpose of com-
pelling a subsequent confession. Id. at 1311 (emphasis in original).
193. Id. at 1307.
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quent statements must generally be deemed acts of free will.' 94 In Justice
Brennan's view, the Miranda warnings simply do not convey to an individ-
ual the necessary information to enable him to make an informed decision
whether to make a subsequent statement. 195
Turning next to the majority's assertion that neither the fifth amendment
nor its deterrence goal mandates exclusion of "fruits" of a Miranda viola-
tion, Justice Brennan pointed to the language in Miranda specifically identi-
fying the fifth amendment as the source of that decision.196 He then labeled
as erroneous those portions of the Court's subsequent decisions in Tucker
and Quarles that suggested that the Miranda warnings are not themselves
constitutional rights. 97 He maintained that if such assertions are true, then
Miranda must have been "an exercise of supervisory authority over interro-
gation practices," a power the Supreme Court does not possess. 19 8 In fur-
ther support of his position, he referred to the Tucker Court's reliance upon
the statement in Miranda that the Constitution does not "necessarily re-
quire[ ] adherence to any particular solution."' 9 9 He pointed out that in so
relying, Tucker neglected Miranda's further assertion that although the spe-
cific warnings enunciated in Miranda may not be constitutionally required,
warnings of at least equal effectiveness are mandated by the Constitution.2"
Justice Brennan sharply criticized the majority for its conclusion that ex-
clusion of Elstad's second confession would not further the deterrence
goal.'O° First, he labelled the Court's reliance on Tucker as a gross mis-
characterization, noting that Tucker invited "application of the derivative-
evidence rule" in cases in which the authorities acted unreasonably.2 °2 Sec-
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1308. Justice Brennan asserted:
Where an accused believes that it is futile to resist because the authorities already
have elicited an admission of guilt, the mere rendition of Miranda warnings does not
convey the information most critical at that point to ensuring his informed and vol-
untary decision to speak again: that the earlier confession may not be admissible and
thus that he need not speak out of any feeling that he already has sealed his fate.
Id. Justice Brennan then undertook to establish that the majority's assertion in this regard is
"completely at odds with established dissipation analysis," id. at 1308, as demonstrated by a
comparison with various factors most commonly relied upon by lower courts. See id. at 1308-
11.
196. Id. at 1313 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
197. Id. at 1314.
198. Id.
199. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
200. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1314 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467). See supra note 101.
201. See id. at 1317-19.
202. Id. at 1318. Justice Brennan maintained that "[i]f the police acted in an objectively
unreasonable manner, .... Tucker's 'reasoning' instead requires suppression of Elstad's subse-
quent statement." Id.
1985]
Catholic University Law Review
ond, he accused the majority of failing to consider that by admitting Elstad's
written confession into evidence, the Court threatens to encourage the
authorities to "accomplish indirectly what they could not accomplish
directly."
2 0 3
Finally, Justice Brennan criticized the majority's contention that the self-
incrimination clause prohibits only testimony that has been actually com-
pelled.2 °4 Contending that the fifth amendment prohibits derivative evi-
dence as well, he noted that the majority's assertion encourages violation of
the self-incrimination clause by seemingly permitting the authorities to use
an illegally obtained confession to obtain other admissible evidence.2 °5
Justice Stevens, in a comparatively brief dissent, criticized the Court's
holding as conflicting with Supreme Court precedent, imparting "confusion
and uncertainty" to the criminal justice system, and belittling the privilege
against self-incrimination.20 6 Notwithstanding his assertion that the major-
ity narrowly confined its holding to situations similar to the facts in the case,
Justice Stevens took issue with its conclusions that Elstad's initial confession
was not coerced and that his constitutional rights were not violated in the
initial questioning.20 7
Echoing Justice Brennan, Justice Stevens criticized as untenable the
Court's attempt to differentiate between actual coercion and the Miranda
presumption of coercion.20 8 He argued that, because the Miranda presump-
tion necessarily assumes the existence of a coercive atmosphere and because
the Court in Miranda was motivated by a desire to avoid a case-by-case
examination of facts, a distinction between actual and presumed coercion
cannot stand. 20 9 Further, he asserted that an illegal initial confession with-
out Miranda warnings tends to strengthen, rather than weaken, the pre-
sumption of coercion present in a subsequent interrogation.
2 ,0
Justice Stevens' strongest attack on the majority opinion was directed at
the conclusion that the case involved no constitutional violation. He argued
that the Court's authority in Miranda must have necessarily emanated from
the Constitution, lest it have been "nothing more than an illegitimate exer-
cise of raw judicial power.",2 1 1 Consequently, Justice Stevens concluded, the
Court's assertion that Miranda is not constitutionally based is "either disin-
203. Id. at 1319 (quoting Pitler, supra note 74, at 620).
204. Id. at 1315.
205. Id. at 1315, 1317.
206. Id. at 1323.
207. Id. at 1322-23.
208. Id. at 1324.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1325.
211. Id. at 1325-26.
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genuous or completely lawless." '2 12
B. Elstad's Effect on the Miranda Doctrine
Although the Elstad decision adhered to the basic holding of Miranda
mandating the exclusion of an accused's statements obtained absent the req-
uisite warnings, the Court's interpretation departs from the underlying val-
ues of both Miranda and the fifth amendment. Moreover, the Court's
conclusion signals its desire to return to a pre-Miranda case-by-case inquiry
into the specific facts of each case, precisely the evil that Miranda sought to
eradicate in self-incrimination cases.
While the Elstad decision is basically consistent with the Court's recent
interpretations of Miranda, it is in conflict with the principles on which Mi-
randa is based. The majority in Elstad relied upon the Burger Court's ear-
lier decisions undercutting the constitutional basis of the Miranda
warnings,2" 3 but failed to offer a substitute basis for the Miranda Court's
authority, an issue raised by both dissents.214 It is axiomatic that the
Supreme Court does not possess the authority to regulate methods of crimi-
nal procedure within a state.2" 5 Thus, if the majority's position that the Mi-
randa warnings are not mandated by the Constitution is accepted, then the
question of an alternative source of authority remains uncertain.
Justice O'Connor's characterization of Elstad's written confession as a
voluntary disclosure2" 6 is inconsistent with the principles underlying Mi-
randa. The majority's conclusion that a subsequent statement made after a
Miranda violation is ordinarily to be considered voluntary,2 17 leaves Mi-
randa effective only in cases involving actual coercion as defined in pre-Mi-
randa terms.2 1 To apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine solely to
those situations involving a clear violation of due process, as the majority
suggests,2 19 ignores what the Court in Miranda specifically recognized: that
custodial interrogation absent the requisite warnings is by definition involun-
212. Id. at 1325.
213. See id. at 1291-92; see also supra notes 99-104, 135 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 196-200, 211-12 and accompanying text.
215. As Justice Douglas observed in his Tucker dissent, "[tihe Court is not free to prescribe
preferred modes of interrogation absent a constitutional basis." Tucker, 417 U.S. at 462
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
216. See Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1294-96, 1298; see also supra notes 166-70 and accompanying
text.
217. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1296. "A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a
suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove
the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement." Id.
218. See supra note 85 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying note 105.
219. See Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1291-93; see also supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
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tary, regardless of the existence of actual coercion.22 ° It stands to reason
that, by virtue of the presumed involuntariness of the initial admission, a
second statement must be deemed tainted unless the suspect is made aware
of the inadmissibility of his initial statement. The information conveyed in
the Miranda warnings is devoid of this critical element. Justice O'Connor's
argument that the subsequent administration of the Miranda warnings
serves to apprise a suspect of the information he needs to make a rational
choice whether to speak further 221 is, as Justice Brennan noted in his dissent,
weakened.2 22
Furthermore, the majority disregards the fifth amendment values underly-
ing the Court's decision in Miranda of preserving the accusatory nature of
the criminal justice system and protecting the individual's ability to make a
rational and free choice.223 The majority instead interprets the Miranda ex-
clusionary rule as founded entirely on a theory of deterrence, 224 the justifica-
tion enunciated for the exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment.22 5
The fourth amendment exclusionary rule was designed primarily as a means
of discouraging police from engaging in unlawful searches and seizures by
excluding the evidence so derived, and thus removing any incentive to vio-
late the amendment. 226 The fifth amendment is, on the other hand, itself an
exclusionary rule, requiring suppression of all involuntary confessions in or-
der to preserve the accusatory nature of the criminal justice system and to
protect individual free will and dignity.
227
Moreover, the result the majority reaches, far from deterring improper
police behavior, may provide an incentive for the police to violate Miranda.
To admit fruits of a Miranda violation, even while suppressing the primary
evidence, may encourage police officers to violate Miranda, obtain an ex-
cludable confession, administer the Miranda warnings, and then ask the sus-
pect to reconfirm his confession. As Justice Brennan asserted, this is the
result the majority's conclusion may invite.228 In order to deter police mis-
220. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455-56, 461, 467; see also supra notes 52-55 and accompany-
ing text.
221. See Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1294, 1296; see also supra note 169 and accompanying text.
222. See Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1308 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 193-95 and
accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
224. See Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1293; see also supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 15, 142.
226. See supra notes 15, 142.
227. See supra notes 3, 62-63 and accompanying text.
228. See Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1299, 1318-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "If violations of
constitutional rights may not be remedied through the well-established rules respecting deriva-
tive evidence, as the Court has held today, there is a critical danger that the rights will be
rendered nothing more than a mere 'form of words.' " Id. at 1299 (quoting Silverthorne Lum-
[Vol. 35:245
Oregon v. Elstad
conduct and further the fifth amendment goals of adversariness and protec-
tion of individual rights, all evidence obtained through the violation of
Miranda, primary as well as derivative, should be excluded.
A final effect of Elstad is to undercut the Miranda Court's insistence on a
"bright line" rule and its explicit rejection of a balancing test for determining
violations of the fifth amendment.22 9 The Elstad majority concluded that,
rather than apply a rigid rule, the factfinder "must examine the surrounding
circumstances and the entire course of police conduct with respect to the
suspect in evaluating the voluntariness of his statements. '230 To require the
lower courts to review the unique facts of each case before a finding of exclu-
sion is warranted is to return to the problems associated with the case-by-
case "totality of the circumstances" analysis of the pre-Miranda days. 23' It
was precisely this vagueness and inconsistency in application that the Mi-
randa Court sought to eradicate.2 32 The Elstad majority now, in further
modifying the Miranda rationale, places once again upon the defendant the
burden of demonstrating actual coercion, as defined by a due process stan-
dard, before the fruits of Miranda violations will be suppressed. Conse-
quently, the end result is likely to be inconsistent ad hoc decisions, thereby
placing the defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
in jeopardy. In order to ensure preservation of the privilege, the Court must
fulfill its responsibility to articulate reasonably explicit and workable stan-
dards for future application by lower courts. The Elstad majority has failed
to meet this obligation.
In effect, Elstad ignores the fifth amendment values and premises upon
which the Court in Miranda based its decision. Although the Court reaf-
firmed Miranda's holding that statements obtained in violation of its stric-
tures be excluded from the prosecution's case-in-chief, the majority's new
rule suggests the Court's desire to return to a due process standard of actual
coercion for the exclusion of relevant evidence.233
ber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)). See also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466. "[A]II
the careful safeguards erected around the giving of testimony, whether by an accused or any
other witness, would become empty formalities in a procedure where the most compelling
possible evidence of guilt, a confession, would have already been obtained at the unsupervised
pleasure of the police." Id. (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
229. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
230. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1298; see supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
233. On August 25, 1985, in an interview with David Brinkley, United States Attorney
General Edwin Meese III stated in reference to the Miranda decision,
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III. CONCLUSION
The Oregon v. Elstad decision exemplifies the way in which constitutional
law may change to mirror the temper of the Court. In deciding fifth amend-
ment questions, courts necessarily confront a tension between the public in-
terest in the protection of society against crime and the preservation of
individual liberties. By shifting the emphasis more in favor of obtaining con-
victions and placing a lesser value upon preserving the accusatory system
and constitutional liberties under the fifth amendment, the present majority
is reflecting its increased concern with the successful prosecution of
criminals.
Despite the Court's legitimate concern with effective criminal prosecu-
tions, this shift in emphasis is inconsistent with Miranda and costly in terms
of individual constitutional rights. In Elstad, the Supreme Court revitalized
the case-by-case, "totality of the circumstances" analysis under the coerced
confession doctrine, previously laid to rest in Miranda, as it pertains to con-
secutive confessions. Its ruling that "fruits" of Miranda violations be ex-
cluded only when derived from actually compelled confessions represents a
continuing trend by the Court to limit the protection afforded by the Mi-
randa doctrine. This narrow view of the fifth amendment undermines the
spirit and express values of Miranda and opens the way to the admission of
coerced statements into evidence.
Bettie E. Goldman
I think the idea that police cannot ask questions of the person who knows the most
about the crime is an infamous decision. I think it's a wrong decision.
I think if a person doesn't want to answer, that's their right. But you've had time
after time all these ridiculous situations in which police are precluded from asking
the one person who knows the most about the crime.
Wash. Post, Aug. 26, 1985, at A6, cols. 1-2. In criticizing the Miranda decision further, Mr.
Meese accused the Supreme Court of "inventing new law." Id. at A6, col. i.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in at least three cases involving Miranda for
review in the October 1985 term. See Michigan v. Jackson, 421 Mich. 39, 365 N.W.2d 56
(1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2654 (1985); Moran v. Burbine, 753 F.2d 178 (1st Cir.), cert.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 2316 (1985); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 741 F.2d 329 (11 th Cir. 1984), cert.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 2319 (1985).
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